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Abstract 
After much hesitation, discussion, and power brokering, Australia adopted digital TV for its Free-to air 
broadcasting on January 1, 2001. However, by December 2002, only a few thousand homes had adopted 
the technology. This paper examines the implementation and regulation of digital TV in Australia from 
the point of view of the ‘established base’ the new technology will replace, theories on diffusion and in-
novation of new technologies, and the Justification Model, which sees technology choice as social gam-
bling. It then evaluates the various protectionist regulations and limitations imposed on the technology 
to safeguard the various stakeholders, the implementation strategies used, lack of digital content, mar-
keting efforts, negative media coverage, and the economic realities of the technology, and argues that if 
consumers reject the technology altogether, it would lead to Australia missing the future applications of 
digital technology and the opportunity to address the issue of the ‘digital divide’ in the 21st century.  
Keywords: Digital TV, Australian broadcasting, Adoption and diffusion of digital TV, Broadcasting 
policy and regulation, Diffusion of innovations, Digital broadcasting in Australia, Broadcast spectrum 
allocation, Protectionism in broadcasting policy, Australian broadcasting policy, consumer response to 
new technology  
Introduction 
In what was termed a ‘ground-breaking reform,’ Australia adopted Digital Television (DTV) on January 
1, 2001. In a media release, the Minister for Communications, the Information Economy and the Arts in 
Australia (DoCITA)- Senator Richard Alston announced that, “with digital television heralding an excit-
ing new era in communication, these reforms will ensure that Australia is at the forefront of global de-
velopments…(and that)…. Australians will experience in their lounge rooms the cinema picture quality 
and surround sound of High Definition Television” (www.dca.gov.au). However, according to some 
analysts, DTV in Australia “began with a whimper rather than a bang” (www.assg.org.au) and consumer 
interest in the new technology so far has been ‘sluggish’ (Hawthorne, 2002). 
What is Digital Media? 
Digital media refers to ‘forms of media content that combine and integrate data, text, sound and images 
of all kinds, are stored in digital formats, and are increasingly distributed through networks such as those 
based upon broadband fibre optic cables, satel-
lites, and microwave transmission systems’ 
(Flew, 2002; p. 11). Digital media content can be 
‘manipulated, networked, is dense, compressible, 
indifferent to the forms represented, its ownership 
or creation, and its final uses because it simply 
sees content as a sequence of numerical zeroes 
and ones’ (Flew, 2002, p. 11). 
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What is Digital TV? 
DTV, seen as the next evolution of television is compared to the change brought to vinyl records by 
compact discs. Instead of the waveforms used in analogue TV signals, DTV uses a digital sequence of 
zeros and ones. DTV is considered superior in engineering terms as it can overcome problems in over-
the- air broadcasting caused by reflections from and obstructions by buildings and terrain features, inter-
ferences of electrical noise (eg. Motor vehicle ignition, overhead power lines, digital mobile phones and 
other transmissions), and fluctuations in signal strength as they pass through the atmosphere 
(www.digitaltv.com.au).  
DTV can also deliver stunning pictures, surround sound and closed captioning as well as extras such as 
different camera angles, multi-channelling, delivering data such as the Internet, and provide interactivity 
to the viewers who can choose what to watch and when to watch it (www.abc.net.au). It can also provide 
access to websites, text-based information and back –channel links to the broadcasting service providers 
as well as develop new services that take advantage of the economies of digital spectrum use and en-
hance TV as a medium with the development of Internet- like capabilities (Flew, 2002; p. 111). 
The two types of Digital TV used in Australia are Standard Definition TV (SDTV) and High Definition 
TV (HDTV). SDTV provides a similar picture to the existing analog service, but has the wide screen 
format, and may offer improved reception for many viewers along with all the benefits of DTV as they 
become available. In contrast, HDTV has outstanding image resolution, which is higher than of SDTV 
and the existing analog picture. HDTV also provides cinema quality viewing with the wide screen fo r-
mat and CD quality sound (www.abc.net.au).   
Theoretical Framework 
The Justification Model (Hemelink, 1988) sees decision-making about technology as a form of social 
gambling. This is due to our having only partial knowledge about a technology, its capabilities, potential 
applications, and effects. We also do not know what a technology will actually be used for once imple-
mented or if it will be widely adopted or even adopted at all. When making policy about a new techno l-
ogy such as Digital TV, issues related to the ‘established base’- the existing technology and infrastruc-
ture that the new technology will replace (Green, 2001) also need to be considered.   
Diffusion of Innovations 
Rogers (1995) and Manross and Rice (1986) have shown that adoption of a new technology into a given 
social structure involves an individual level decision-making, where it needs to be accepted by the ulti-
mate user. The factors that affect adoption at the individual level are its: 1) perceived relative advantage, 
2) compatibility, 3) complexity, 4) trialability, and 5) observability. 
The relative advantage is the degree to which a new technology is perceived by the user as being supe-
rior to the one it replaces (the established base); compatibility is the degree to which a new technology is 
consistent with the adopter’s prior experience, va lues and beliefs; complexity is the degree to which an 
innovation is perceived by the user as being difficult to understand; trialablity or divisibility is the de-
gree to which an innovation can be given a small scale trial by a potential adopter or the extent to which 
parts of the innovation can be tried; and observability or communicability refers to the degree to which a 
new technology is visible to potential adopters. Innovations that are perceived by prospective users as 
high in relative advantage, low in complexity, high in compatibility, communicability and divisibility 
result in a more rapid rate of adoption. During the initial stages of adoption of a new techno logy, it is 
generally expensive and therefore affordable and attractive mainly to the groups called ‘innovators’– 
(2.5% of the population), and the ‘early adopters’- (13.5% of the population), who are made up of 
younger, higher educated risk takers and those with high levels of disposable incomes (Rogers, 1995; 
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Green, 2001). The rest will take a wait-and-see attitude for the price of the technology to drop due to 
economies of scale as the technology gets more widely adopted. 
New Technology-Same Old Functions 
Stephens (1998) shows how every time a new technology is adopted by society, it is initially used to 
carry out the same functions of the old technology or the established base. So when digital TV pro-
gramming carries the same content as the analog signals (with only a better quality sound and picture), 
there is little incentive for viewers to invest large sums of money to buy DTV equipment.  
Method 
Using library research (Berger, 1998), the author examined the latest research, policies and existing lit-
erature on the subject of DTV via scholarly sources. The research also included the websites of all 
broadcast organizations adopting the technology and those of policy making bodies such as the DoCITA 
and the Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) and trade organizations related to DTV. In addition, a 
search of the Nexis.com (University Research Tool) database was carried out to identify articles pub-
lished on DTV in the major international, national and regional newspapers for the last five years, to ob-
tain an in depth understanding of the implementation of DTV in Australia.  
Issues Related to the Low Penetration of Digital TV 
According to existing literature and research, broader technical, political, and economic factors appear to 
be responsible for the consumer apathy towards DTV in Australia. These factors are: 1) constraints im-
posed by legislation on those granted the licences to broadcast on DTV, 2) protectionist policies intro-
duced in a bid to safeguard the license holders from competitors, 3) implementation strategies, 4) con-
sumer expectations and disincentives to adopt the technology and 5) Inadequate marketing strategies. 
Therefore, an examination of the history of DTV regulation, economic realities of the new technology, 
and the digital content so far available to consumers, would shed more light on the issue of low penetra-
tion of DTV in Australia. 
The history of digital TV regulation in Australia 
Governments are motivated to move from analog TV to DTV as the latter allows more efficient use of 
the broadcast spectrum and as a result, provides a source of revenue from the sale of spectrum access to 
other industries such as telecommunications. At the same time, however, they have to consider the inter-
ests of all stakeholders- especially consumers with low income who should not be burdened with a re-
quirement to purchase any expensive new equipment and those in rural and remote areas who may be 
excluded from receiving its transmissions (Flew, 2002). 
The adoption of digital TV was long under discussion, and faced much hesitation and power brokering. 
Officially, the process dates back to the first meeting of the Australian Broadcasting Authority Digital 
Terrestrial Television Specialist Group on the 26th of May 1993. The group presented its first report in 
1995 and the final report on 30th January 1997, titled “Digital Terrestrial Television Broadcasting in 
Australia.” In July 1997, The Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) released its response to the Spe-
cialist Group Report. In late 1997, the Department of Communication and the Arts and the Federation of 
Australian Commercial Television Stations in conjunction with the Australian Broadcasting Authority 
(ABA) and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) conducted tests for the potential DTV tech-
nology for use in Australia. On 24 March 1998, the government of John Howard announced its DTV 
policy and between April 1998 and 15 July 1998, the necessary legislation was passed though Australian 
parliament and the Senate (www.digitaltv.com.au). The reforms of 1998 that led to the adoption of digi-
tal TV on January 1, 2001 meant that commercial and national free-to-air broadcasters (FTAs) were re-
quired to commence digital terrestrial broadcasting (DTTB) in the metropolitan areas by January 1, 2001 
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and in regional areas from that day onwards so that all areas will have DTTB by January 1, 2004 
(www.digitaltv.com.au/timelines.html). No new broadcasting licenses are to be issued at least till 2007 
as a means of protecting the A$1 billion investment made by FTAs in converting to DTV as Australia is 
a comparatively small market of a population around 20 million (www.abs.gov.au).  
These rules were seen as a victory for Kerrie Packer (the richest man and a major media owner in Aus-
tralia, who owns Publishing and Broadcasting Limited or PBL) and his Channel 9 free-to –air TV sta-
tion, and the channel 10 TV network owned by Conwest (of Canada). However, they are seen as disap-
pointing to the datacasting aspirations of News Corporation (one of the three major media conglomer-
ates in the world and owned by Australian-born Rubert Murdoch who is also a major owner of Austra-
lian media) and others such as John Fairfax and OzEmail, as they cannot air anything that looks like a 
TV program on the datacasting spectrum allocated for its functions. However, the free-to-air stations are 
also bound by restrictions, as they are required to transmit DTV at a lower standard than expected 
(Shanahan, 1999). 
DTV was heavily regulated by Prime Minister John Howard’s Government in an attempt to please most 
of the stakeholders concerned – viz. the existing FTAs who were considered the only group that has the 
market penetration necessary to make it financially viable, the public, and other interests. But no real 
incentives have been provided for the incumbent players (the FTAs), to encourage DTV adoption by 
consumers (News Limited, 2000).  
Prescriptive and protectionist policies 
New datacasting license holders on DTV are restricted on the video content they can carry which means 
they cannot broadcast news, current affairs, or sports programming and are limited to entertainment pro-
gramming only up to 10 minutes in duration. Any news bulletins can only be up-dated every 30 minutes. 
These rules will allow viewers to access the Internet (but not Internet TV broadcasts) via DTV, e-mail, 
home banking and shopping services, education and interactive games. Prospective data casters argued 
that these restrictions destroy the main attraction of DTV (Shanahan, 1999) as datacasting is intended to 
cater to niche markets, the licenses will be of limited utility with limits on the entertainment content that 
can be provided (Rennie, 2001). This argument was proven in May 2001, when the Australian govern-
ment had to call off the datacasting licensing auction due to lack of market interest, as the prescriptive 
rules imposed on the techno logy had inhibited market interest and scared off the News Corporation, 
Fairfax, and Telstra, which were the potential major bidders (Datacasting in disarray, 2001, May 10). 
However, the FTAs are also bound by restrictions, as they must transmit three types of signals – the ex-
isting analog, SDTV and HDTV. The analog signal is to continue for at least until 2008, so that aud i-
ences are not compelled to purchase -either set-top boxes that convert the analog signal to digital or the 
expensive SDTV and HDTV receivers immediately (www.dba.org.au). 
Customer response 
By the 20th of April 2001, only 3000 set top boxes have been sold (Only 3000 cough up for digital TV, 
2001, April 30) and by 1 st of January 2002 or one year after its adoption, only a few thousand house-
holds had acquired the technology needed to receive digital TV signals in the form of set top boxes for 
the existing analog TV sets or new digital wide screen sets (Gilchrist, 2002; Hawthorne, 2002). By the 
end of January 2003 (or two years since implementation), only about 20,000 set top boxes have been 
sold (Familari, 2003; http://news.ninemsn.com.au ) in a nation with 10m TV households. In contrast, a 
comparable technology change viz. black and white to colour TV on March 1, 1976, saw 4% of Sydney 
and 3% of Melbourne homes adopting the technology by the end of that year and 54% of Sydney and 
48% of Melbourne homes adopting it by the end of 1977 or two years after implementation (ACNielsen, 
1999). This was when a colour TV set cost A$2000 in 1998 terms (Given, 1998). However, one should 
also consider that the change in the viewing experience for consumers moving from black and white to 
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colour TV in 1976 far exceeds the change from today’s colour TV to digital TV and therefore the con-
version be less of a priority for consumers today.  
Cost of the new technology 
Today, a set top box that receives SDTV signals are priced between A$300 and $699 and a HDTV set 
top which can also receive SDTV ranges from A$799-1079. Australian consumers purchase 1M new 
sets a year within the price range A$300-$700 (Familari, 2003). Research predicts that 46% homes 
would adopt digital TV by 2008, when the analog to digital conversion is expected to be complete 
(Rumble, Hoare, & Schulze, 2002).   
A recent proposal by the Department of Communication, Information Technology and the Arts (Do-
CITA) is to legislate mandatory built- in tuners for all new TV sets sold as a means of encouraging digi-
tal TV adoption. However it faces opposition from importers and retailers who fear limits to the variety 
of models available to the Australian market and retailers fear it would increase the price of a set by 
about A$200 affecting their sales. However, this proposal was later modified to include only the more 
expensive sets (Day, 2002). The traders propose a combination of more channels, improved content and 
a clear policy on DTV as better incentives for the industry and consumers (Familari, 2003). It is worth 
noting that a similar scenario occurred in the USA, when the FCC (Federal Communications Commis-
sion) regulated built- in tuners for new analog TV sets (Moore, 2002). 
Digital content 
The lack of programming produced in digital is considered one of the factors responsible for the low 
DTV penetration in Australia so far because consumers watch TV for the content, not the technology 
(Clifford, 1992). He points out that the Cable News Network (CNN) did not gain high ratings or prestige 
until its live coverage of the 1991 Gulf War and that ‘the ratings of TV stations had remained the same 
after the introduction of colour TV (from black and white TV) and improved only after program content 
improved’ (Clifford, 1992, p. 67). Therefore, from the consumers’ point of view, what is on DTV is 
more important than the quality of the picture and sound it provides. 
Australian FTA television consists of the three commercial channels 7, 9, 10 and the two public broad-
casters- the ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) and SBS (The Special Broadcasting Service 
intended for multicultural programming). The Australian government has imposed quota requirements 
for HDTV at 20 hours per week on the FTAs who are granted the right to adopt DTV. These obligations 
will commence on 1st July 2003 for mainland (except Tasmania) capital cities and effectively not before 
2005 in other areas. Any program transmitted in HDTV will be simultaneously broadcast on SDTV 
(www.dba.org.au). 
Digital Broadcasting Australia (DBA) estimates that wide screen programming comprises 60% of cur-
rent primetime viewing, with the Seven, Nine and Ten networks providing all their new drama, lifestyle, 
game show and sports programming in 16: 9 wide screen format. The Nine and Ten networks also pro-
vide all their news and current affairs programming on wide screen. The SBS and ABC also provide 
wide screen on selected programs, including Australian drama and various overseas drama and docu-
mentaries (www.dba.org.au). However, some of these HDTV programs will be initially ‘up-converted’ 
from existing analog programs, so the difference in quality may not be significant (www.abc.net.au). 
The highest programming content in the digital format is provided by the ABC which is a public broad-
caster with ‘ABC Kids’ showing mostly reruns of popular kids’ programs and ‘ABC Fly’ with its music, 
dance and discussion programming aimed at 15-25 year olds (Gilchrist, 2002). However, ABC like any 
public broadcaster worldwide has a lower viewer base than the commercial networks. Therefore the 
viewers who may be motivated to purchase the digital techno logy and thereby add to the number of 
households adopting it would be smaller in number, especially when its digital TV programming fare is 
catering to the under 25 demographic with little or no purchasing power for the necessary equipment. 
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The ABC’s digital content is expected to drive the growth of DTV but the genre restrictions it is faced 
with for multi-channelling may have to be lifted if its programming is broaden its appeal to consumers 
(Lawson, 2002). However, ABC- unlike other FTA channels, has universal reach especially in regional 
and rural Australia and is perceived by the community as providing a valuable service. It has also in-
creased its ratings by 5% according to the last survey of 1999 (Ede, 2002).   
The ABC spends about A$7 M a year on its two digital channels and is sometimes asked the question if 
it could be better spent on mainstream programming (Simper, 2003a). Since 1996, the ABC has been 
faced with funding cuts from the Howard government and the ABC has threatened to ‘dump the digital 
channels’ and other recent analog programming initiatives if a 7% increase in its funding for 2003-4 is 
not met. About A$17 M of this funding increase is earmarked for developing and expanding its digital 
network. The ABC argues that such funding for digital content has the potential to stimulate consumers 
to take up DTV (MacKenzie (2003). If these digital services, which are the only digital channels on air, 
are discontinued due to budgetary constraints, it may lead to an embarrassment for the government, 
which introduced DTV to Australia (Simper, 2003b). However, the Australian government cannot also 
be expected to foot the bill of the ABC digital channel and the public broadcaster, which has low ratings. 
Providing incentives for commercial broadcasters to produce digital content would be an alternative, but 
the free allocation of the broadcast spectrum already provided to them-(while the mobile phone spec-
trum was auctioned off at high prices) (Gilchrist, 2000), may be considered incentive enough by many. 
Discussion 
The library research indicated that the main problem faced by DTV in its early stages of adoption in 
Australia was the non-availability of equipment for purchase such as set top boxes for existing analog 
TV sets. This situation was attributed to the changes made to specifications that delayed the set boxes’ 
arrival in the stores in Australia until mid- 2001. The high cost of wide screen digital TV sets, the con-
tinuation of the analog TV signals (the established base) until 2008, and the non-availability of sufficient 
new programming in the digital format, and restrictions on datacasters that can limit what digital TV can 
provide to Australian viewers, are factors that negatively affect the incentives for viewers to adopt digi-
tal TV. In other words, the low relative advantage (Rogers, 1995; Manross & Rice, 1986) of the digital 
TV with reference to cost, programming and service choice, in comparison to the established base 
(Green, 2001) of analog TV for consumers, are the main factors that have so far limited the adoption of 
digital TV in Australia.  
Building Alliances 
When faced with arguments that an estimated five million British viewers watch Sky News on digital 
TV and that even Britain’s failed digital network Independent TV (ITV) digital had 1.26 million sub-
scribers when it folded in April 2001, Richard Alston explained that Sky, Britain’s largest subscription 
television service was switching to digital, while in Australia, only FTA terrestrial services were re-
quired to make the change. “There is nothing stopping satellite providers in Australia from digitising, or 
Cable providers (called Pay TV) from doing so, but they haven’t done it, although they may well do it as 
part of the Foxtel-Optus deal (recently made for Pay TV)”…The debates in Australia has only been 
about a very narrow portion, which is free to-air terrestrial…. and that is not what is occurring  (in Brit-
ain) at all” (http://news.ninemsn.com.au; Nine signs off on Foxtel deal, 2002 Decembe 28). Foxtel- the 
current leader in Pay TV in Australia is part-owned by both Rupert Murdoch’s News Limited and Kerrie 
Packer’s Publishing and Broadcasting Limited (PBL) media conglomerates. Kerrie Packer also has a 
minority share in Optus Vision (a Pay TV service) (www.mitchells.com.au). Therefore, such an alliance 
for pooling resources could help improve audience take up of DTV. 
Cable or Pay TV services were adopted in Australia in mid-1995 and have been slowly but steadily in-
creasing their subscriber base (Kitney, 2002). So as Minister Richard Alston argues, digitising Pay TV 
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signals could make adopting digital TV more attractive to subscribers who are also viewers of the FTA 
services. As Pay TV is subscribed to by households with higher disposable incomes, they may well be 
the ones who can also afford to purchase the set top boxes or wide screen TV sets required for receiving 
DTV signals. However, this digitalisation won’t be attractive to Pay TV services, unless the investment 
can be justified with a large enough subscriber base. 
The Minister also thinks that Australia should follow the US in using initiatives to encourage take up of 
digital TV by viewers with the requirement of mandatory digital tuners to be embedded in all new TV 
sets sold (Hawthorne, 2002). “The free-to-air networks say that there should be a common set top box 
mandated with a dual tuner to accommodate either satellite and cable or satellite and terrestrial or cable 
and terrestrial. …….We (Australians) are looking at that….. I think it has a number of complications. 
There are some things you can do to stimulate it (the adoption of digital TV), but at the end of the day 
it’s going to be a matter of how the consumers respond and all we can do is facilitate the framework” 
(http://news.ninemsn.com.au). 
Patterns of Adoption 
The early stage of adoption of a new technology that Australia is going through with DTV can be seen 
as that belonging to the early adoption stage where only 2.5% of the population of ‘innovators’ will 
adopt it and fits with the “S” curve for the rate of adoption of a new technology (Rogers, 1995; Green, 
2001). As the current cost of DTV is high, at this stage, it will only appeal to those who can afford it or 
are adventurous, in keeping with that group’s characteristics. The slow rate of adoption therefore should 
not be labelled ‘a failure’ or ‘bad policy making,’ as the scenario so far appears to fit with the existing 
theories (Rogers, 1995; Green, 2001). This outcome also agrees with Hemelink’s (1988) theory of pol-
icy making with reference to any new technology as being ‘a gamble’ under the Justification Model.    
Cost of the Technology 
Making the technology (eg. the set top box) affordable to a wider consumer base and providing more 
programming content produced in digital format – especially with sports and drama programming, 
which benefit the most from the wide screen format, will be one way to increase the rate of adoption. 
This should provide the digital signal more attractive to viewers while the established base (Green, 
2001) of the analog signal is still available.  
Digitising pay (Cable) TV 
In the United Kingdom (UK), once the News Corporation-owned BSkyB satellite service provided the 
set top boxes free to its Pay TV subscribers, the take up of digitalized Pay TV is reported to have drasti-
cally increased and the service is held up as an example for Australia to follow (Day & Bryden-Brown, 
2001). However, the larger population and the small geographic size of the UK in comparison to Austra-
lia raise the question whether following the UK example is suitable for Australia. The recent failure of 
ITV- the other smaller DTV service in the UK sends warning signals that the success of digitalised Pay 
TV is not a given (Kitney, 2002). In Australia, for such a service to succeed, anti-siphoning regulation 
on popular sporting events (which specifies that they should not be exclusive to Pay TV) may have to be 
removed to make Pay TV attractive to subscribers. However, Pay TV that was introduced in mid-1995 
in Australia only had about 800,000 subscribers at the end of 2002 (Turner, 2002). The main reason for 
the low take up of Cable is the cost of installation and monthly subscription, which again would raise the 
question as to its suitability as an alternative to increase DTV adoption. 
A common set-top box 
Another strategy worth considering is the Channel 10 Network’s proposed common digital set top box 
or ‘dual tuner’ for both FTA and Pay TV, which the ABC has supported and would reduce hardware 
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costs to consumers (Lawson, 2002). A common set top box for FTA digital TV and Pay TV (Lawson, 
2002) as well as Sony Play Station 2 (expected to introduce a digital tuner and Internet browser to their 
games consoles soon) (Turner, 2002) could be a possibility with an alliance between many players, even 
though it will then raise issues of the convergence of media technologies, industries, and functions re-
sulting in limited diversity and monopolies (McChesney, 1998).  
The more sophisticated digital set top boxes can be used for collecting ratings data for audience meas-
urements via its ‘back channel’ function (Garland, 2002), which is a more reliable method than the cur-
rent use of ratings panels (Thomas, 2002), provided the DTV penetration is high enough. As the Austra-
lian ratings organization OzTAM is owned by the three FTA broadcast networks, they along with Pay 
TV could be encouraged to invest in a plan to increase TV set top box or DTV adoption. Pay TV can use 
the same boxes for their billing functions. Such an alliance may also be able to either provide set top 
boxes free or at a subsidized rate to consumers. In the US, industry competitors- either voluntarily or at 
the behest of the government, formed alliances and pooled resources to develop suitable technical sys-
tems for their digital broadcast systems (FCC, 1996; Warley, 2002). However, Australia with no such 
precedents of alliance-formation may find the possibility of one now a challenge more than ever as 
shown by the reluctance of Foxtel partners for the dual tuner had indicated, where partners of Foxtel- 
PBL, News Corporation and Telstra (telecommunications), could not agree on a dual tuner for both FTA 
and Pay TV as Telstra wanted to protect its cable system as exclusive (Kitney, 2002). 
Built-in tuners 
However, the built in digital tuners- only for the larger screen sizes initially) could be a better alternative 
than a dual or multiple tuner, as a non-mandated requirement. Most of the people who buy the 1M new 
TVs in Australia each year may be willing as well as able to afford the additional $200 dollars towards 
DTV instead of having to spend thousands for DTV. A considerable demand for such sets would drive 
the price of these sets down fast. 
Marketing 
DTV adoption is also claimed to be suffering from the lack of marketing efforts. Consumers appear to 
be confused about the technology, its capabilities and its complex implementation. Until recently, sales 
personnel of TV retailers were not adequately trained to handle inquiries of prospective buyers of DTV 
equipment in a meaningful manner. In November 2002, Digital Broadcasting Australia (DBA) released 
a DVD called “What is Digital TV?” for the information of sales staff and prospective buyers of DTV 
sets, which can be seen as a step in the right direction (Moullakis, 2002). According to Jock Given- a 
researcher into DTV,  “Free-to-air broadcasters need to convince consumers with budgets that digital 
TV is a better option than a computer, an Internet connection or a DVD” (Mitchell, 2002, p. 30).  The 
Internet currently providing 2/3 of the functions of those promised by DTV also makes the new techno l-
ogy less revolutionary for consumers (Mathieson, 1998; Familari, 2003) and should be a factor to be 
considered for inclusion in any marketing efforts. 
Negative media coverage 
Negative press coverage about the ‘failure’ of DTV so far in Australia- mostly published in newspapers 
owned by Fairfax and News Corporation who lost out in the bid for DTV (Datacasting in disarray, May 
10, 2001); Barry 2001; Day & Bryden-Brown, 2001; Gilchrist 2000 & 2002; Lucas, 2001; Only 3000 
cough up for digital TV, 2001 April 30; Day, 2002; Melloy, 2002; Mitchell, 2002; Rumble, Hoare & 
Schulze, 2002; Schulze, 2002)- some even before or soon after the implementation of DTV, discourage 
the average consumer from adopting the technology as they need to be convinced that the technology is 
here to stay. As it stands today, the strict regulatory restrictions and the lack of marketing efforts have 
 Weerakkody 
 1027 
led DTV in Australia to be ‘just pretty pictures for those who can afford them’ or a ‘boutique market for 
the rich’ (Mitchell 2002).  
Conclusion 
As TV is accessible to a larger proportion of Australian homes than the Internet and TV is accessible to 
those who are not computer literate, DTV will be important to Australian consumers in the long run. 
Failure of  DTV would also mean that its future applications would be either delayed or lost Australia 
(Flew, 2002; Shafer, 1992) especially when nations such as the UK are already established at the cutting 
edge of DTV (Day & Bryden-Brown, 2001).   
Interactivity, which is available with DTV, is considered empowering to consumers. However, current 
analog TV viewing habits of the majority of consumers may not be compatible with interactivity (Ren-
nie, 2001). The same can be said about accessing the Internet on DTV as current viewers are used to TV 
viewing as a leisurely and passive activity apart from using the remote control while sitting comfortably 
(Kubey & Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), which may not be compatible with the active individual involve-
ment required of consumers when accessing the Internet for non-broadcast content today. However, with 
the future generations of adults currently growing up on heavily using the Internet, this pattern might 
change or be different.     
DTV that began its service with a zero base of receivers needs to offer ‘added value’ or benefits such as 
Interactive Virtual Reality (VR) and transactional services or perceivable or understandable benefits to 
consumers in order to succeed. But these services may take years of development and / or implementa-
tion (Papathnassopoulos, 1998). Without a large enough consumer base, these expensive alternatives 
will not be financially viable for broadcasters to provide. This leads to a ‘catch-22’ situation where con-
sumers are inhibited from investing in the set- top boxes or new DTV receivers, as there isn’t enough 
digital content or additional services to warrant the expense. Broadcasters on the other hand, are inhib-
ited from providing costly new content and services unless the consumer base is large enough to warrant 
their costs and investment.  
Unfortunately, reducing the attractiveness of the new medium due to restrictions imposed on it for safe-
guarding the various stakeholders and their interests, or the economic realities of providing ‘added 
value’ to the content, can destroy consumer interest and result in Australia losing an opportunity to 
bridge the ‘digital divide’ via access to the Internet with DTV by consumers not yet comfortable using 
the Internet via computers (Flew, 2002; p. 112). Even though the government may have endeavoured to 
protect the interests of consumers in their  policy initiatives, so far, it has not been able to influence the 
desired consumer behaviour in the adoption and diffusion of DTV. Even though Australians in general 
are considered to have a penchant for new technology (Melloy, 2002), digital TV has so far failed to at-
tract them in significant numbers. In other words, it has resulted in consumers becoming more active in 
their inactivity than active government policy or industry strategies. This situation agrees with Owen 
(1999), which argues that after implementation of a new technology, government policy may even be 
superfluous to adoption and consumer behaviour.    
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